This is the fourth article in the weekly series of Expert’s Opinion, where we talk to academics who study AI or other emerging technologies and their impact on society and the world.

This week, we spoke to Trisha Ray, a graduate from the Georgetown University in Security Studies, who is currently working as an Associate Fellow at the Observer Researcher Foundation. 

Ray’s research focuses on Geotech, the implications of emerging technology, AI governance and norms, and Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS).

Analytics India Magazine caught up with Ray to understand India’s position on autonomous weapons and her views on LAWS. 

AIM: Looking at the progress various militaries across the globe have made in developing LAWS, a complete ban looks unlikely. What are the possible outcomes for the efforts taken by the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and other organisations to bring LAWS under control?

Ray: The United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) on LAWS has, since 2017, helped refine the discussion on the global governance of autonomous weapons — the most important contribution being the necessity of human control and maintenance of a proper chain of command. In essence, this would rule out fully autonomous weapons systems and provide a resolution (albeit imperfect) to questions raised by experts on accountability for autonomous decision-making. 

There are several major gaps, the most fundamental being a lack of common definition of autonomous weapons. The likely reason is that defining LAWS would identify an object of governance, which in turn will define what capabilities and technologies fall under the purview of any future instrument.

As it stands, the next steps for the UN GGE are concrete and will prove to be divisive. Most of the P-5 (Permanent Five, with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) would be opposed to a meaningfully restrictive governance framework. Others – India included – are cautious about LAWS governance encroaching upon its broader economic ambitions for emerging tech. 

The way the CCW functions is also going to restrict how a governance framework for LAWS is framed. It is a consensus-driven forum, meaning that all parties must agree for any new protocol to come into force. We may soon see a repeat of the UN GGE on Information Security, which failed to reach a consensus and put out a report in 2017. CCW members also do not have to be a party to all the protocols enshrined in the convention, meaning that even if there is a protocol on LAWS in the future, parties to the CCW need not ratify it.

AIM: India has argued in favour of CCW, but at the same time is investing in LAWS. What do you think is India’s current stance on LAWS?

Ray: I have previously described India’s stance on LAWS as “ambivalent by design”. Its statements at the GGE and the Meeting(s) of Experts before that have stressed on “light-touch regulation”, and cautioned against “premature, unnecessary” restrictions. 

India is doing a balancing act between keeping its options open on the development of LAWS to meet its security needs viz militarily aggressive neighbours, its economic ambitions viz emerging technologies and maintaining its global reputation as a responsible actor. I think it is significant that Ambassador D.B. Venkatesh Varma’s statement at the 2014 Meeting of Experts specifically mentions that a governance framework “should not widen the technology gap” or be so lax that the reduced cost of war “encourages the use of lethal force to settle international disputes”.

AIM: If countries like Russia and the US refuse to back down from developing autonomous weapons, will India fall behind geopolitically if it stops production of LAWS? 

Ray: That is likely a concern in the minds of the Indian representatives in Geneva. India’s experience with nuclear non-proliferation may inform this stance as well. 

India has been active in having its concerns heard at the UN GGE, and it is certainly not alone in its concerns. China has ostensibly supported a ban on the deployment of LAWS but is ambivalent when it comes to development. So, Beijing is, in a way, keeping its options open as well.  

AIM: What are the implications if India takes an aggressive stance on LAWS?

Ray: Arms-racing dynamics are a concern in the region. It is unlikely, for example, that Pakistan would continue to adhere to its call early on for a LAWS ban if India were to hypothetically proceed with the development and deployment of LAWS.

AIM: What are your thoughts on India’s existing autonomous weapons such as Muntra tank? How far along are we in achieving the sophistication level of countries like the US?

Ray: Muntra does not qualify as an autonomous weapon by most definitions: it can navigate autonomously but is better categorised as an unmanned vehicle. The DRDO’s Centre for AI & Robotics is also working on a range of command, control, and intelligence applications of AI for situational awareness, to support decision-making. 

The US invests significantly more than India in next-gen military technologies, so it is not a useful comparison. While India is the world’s fourth-largest military spender, the US spends nearly ten times as much as India does.

The component tech for LAWS is where India would really need to focus its investment: sensor fusion, facial recognition, object recognition. At the same time, some of this component tech, notably facial recognition, is embroiled in surveillance concerns so a governance framework for FRT would need to be put in place before its military applications are explored.